Smartcard-based protocols represent an increasingly large share of the wireless authentication market, from contactless payments to remote car unlocking. Unfortunately, relay attacks pose a signifi cant threat to these wireless solutions. is risk can be mitigated through the use of distance-bounding protocols.
I
n the well-known chess grandmaster problem, there are two grandmasters A and B, and player C, who doesn't know much about chess. Grandmaster A is playing white against C, and grandmaster B is playing black against C. Whenever A makes a move, C goes to the other chessboard where he is playing against B and replicates A's latest move. en, C waits for B's move and reproduces it on the board where he is playing against A, and so on. Consequently, both A and B will have a hard time playing against C, even if C isn't a chess expert. In this way, if there is no draw, C will win against one grandmaster. C's devious strategy is nothing but a typical relay a ack.
Today, we have radio-frequency identi cation (RFID) keys to open our cars and even start their engines remotely. We use near-eld communication (NFC) credit cards to make contactless payments. Both of these use protocols between an RFID device (o en called a prover; in this case, the card) and a reader (o en called a veri er). Typically, the protocols require no real input. We hold a card close to the reader without any further prompts for approval or credentials. As a result, these protocols are prone to relay a acks. For example, a malicious reader could capture an honest prover's signals and send them to a malicious prover. e latter will replicate this to an honest veri er. In this way, an a acker can pay with someone else's resources on a valid terminal, without the suspicion of the victim or the terminal.
One way to defeat this a ack is to verify the proximity between the prover and the veri er. is would assume that the protocol is executed correctly from precise locations or within a bounded area. For example, if a card is close to a reader, the communication between the two should happen quickly (this is measurable by the veri er). If the interactions happen rapidly enough, relaying by adversarial parties should be virtually impossible.
Distance bounding (DB), introduced by Stefan Brands and David Chaum in 1993, 1 can help prove proximity. e original idea of enforcing certain security guarantees by measuring communication time came from omas Beth and Yvo Desmedt in 1990. In one DB protocol run, the prover demonstrates that it is in the proximity of a veri er. In DB, the prover also authenticates itself to the veri er.
Distance bounding is prone to some speci c a acks. In distance aud (DF), a prover tries to convince the
TRENDS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
verifier that it is closer than it really is. In a man-in-themiddle (MIM) or "mafia" attack, an adversary tries to demonstrate to an honest verifier that an honest prover is in the verifier's proximity, although the prover is actually far away from the verifier. The adversary could consist of two communicating bodies in the proximity of the prover and the verifier. This threat generalizes relay attacks, in which an adversary passively relays messages. For instance, a prover is buying something in a shop in which a terminal has been tampered with (by the "mafia"). This terminal is relaying the communication to a malicious card carrying out a more expensive transaction in a legitimate shop (with a terminal denoting an honest verifier). In terrorist fraud (TF), an adversary has the same goal as in an MIM attack, but in this case, the prover is dishonest and colludes with the adversary. There are even extensions of these attacks such as distance hijacking, which involves one dishonest, distant prover and several honest provers, without the latter colluding with the former. 2 Driven by the need to defeat relay attacks, distance bounding has recently received more attention, and it will likely be integrated into existing infrastructures. However, many challenges lie ahead.
Implementing the Time-Critical DB Phase
The challenge of implementing the time-critical DB phase is intrinsic to wireless media and relaying (and thus to the DB implementation). For example, the computation delay that RFID tags encounter takes orders of magnitude longer than the communication between the tag and a reader. This difference leaves room for possible relaying, which would be hard to detect if we were to measure or bound the communication times as we do in DB.
A DB protocol always starts with an initialization phase. It then goes through a succession of n rounds. In each round, the verifier sends a challenge and waits for a response to arrive back within a time bound. This waiting time corresponds to the round-trip flight time to the maximum allowed distance to the prover, plus a small overhead due to latency. This DB phase is time critical and imposes very fast computations at each end, typically less than a single clock cycle per round. (Every bit must be treated upon arrival with no delay, and there is virtually no time for extra computations.) But is this achievable in practice? Can RFID-based DB protocols have low enough computation latencies?
Let's estimate some of these bounds, time overheads, latencies, and so on. First, we know that the verifier will accept an honest prover running the protocol from a distance up to some bound, denoted as B close . Therefore, the idealized round-trip flight time between the prover and the verifier is up to
where c is the speed of light. Assuming the honest prover is implemented using a common RFID tag, it will certainly need time to process the reception of a challenge, compute the response, and send it. This total amount of time is denoted as t overhead . So, from the verifier viewpoint, the entire process, from the challenge release to the response arrival, must take
Second, the verifier will reject a malicious prover running the protocol from a point that is beyond a bound, which we denote as B far . There might be a difference in the honest prover's t overhead and that of the malicious prover. So, the round-trip time will be 2 c B far +t overhead t overhead.
Because the malicious prover could use expensive equipment to make this time much shorter, we consider the worst case ∆t overhead ≈ t overhead . To make the protocol feasible, we must have . Now, consider the case of wireless payments at a supermarket. A customer in line at the cashier, one meter away from the payment terminal, might be the victim of a relay attack. To protect him, we will use B far ≤ 1 m. When he pays with his contactless credit card, the protocol should work with B close ≥ 1 cm. So, we must have t overhead ≤ 6.6 ns. This time is very short: think of the fastest transmission rate of Wi-Fi routers reaching 600 Mbytes per second. After sending one bit, the waiting time to send a second bit is as long as 1,667 ns. So, our constraints don't even allow time to send bits in sequence.
Likewise, this very short t overhead doesn't allow a lot of computation on the prover's side. Typically, the response is precomputed in a table. This requires a short challenge: generally, 1 or 2 bits. The usual transmission rate also requires that all challenge bits are sent at the same time. A bit's typical duration is measured in microseconds, which is far too long. Finally, the reception device must interpret the bit as soon as it begins to arrive instead of waiting until the entire bit has arrived. The analog-digital conversion is often too slow, and we might not have time to do it. So, we would rather compute the response in analog mode.
Errors are very likely to occur when interpreting the challenge and sending the response, so a challenge-response round might contain a significant amount of communication noise. These time constraints regarding communication versus computation raise a challenge in real-life DB implementations.
Identifying Security Threats
There are three main types of DB attacks: distance fraud, MIM attacks, and terrorist fraud. As with other threat models, some of these DB attack scenarios are less realistic than others (in our opinion, MIM attacks are the most credible). However, each could pose a real threat in a specific environment. At the same time, the DB community acknowledges that protecting against all these threats at once is cumbersome. The following question arises: While some types of fraud are harder to mount and overall protection seems difficult and costly, could real-life security exist without protection against certain DB frauds?
Terrorist Fraud
One could wonder why we should worry about terrorist fraud at all. Recall that in terrorist fraud, the prover P is malicious and far away, and colludes with a nearby adversary A to make verifier V think that P is close by. To fool V, the prover P simply gives its secret key to the adversary, so that A runs the protocol on behalf of P. People think there's no need to protect against this because malicious provers wouldn't be willing to share their secret. So, this attack isn't considered a valid terrorist fraud. To prevent terrorist fraud, DB protocol designs should make sure that helping A pass the protocol entails A deducing P's secret key. If such an attack occurs, the key leakage makes the attack invalid, so the protocol isn't vulnerable to terrorist fraud. Terrorist fraud is valid if A passes the protocol but doesn't deduce P's secret.
The most common technique to protect against terrorist fraud is making the ith bit of the secret leak from the prover's response-function table in the i round. In each round of the DB phase, the prover calculates a response from the received challenge. Having A pass the protocol with a good probability implies that A must know the response to all possible challenges in each round. In other words, A must know the full table of the response functions. Typically, the exclusive or (XOR) operation of all entries in the table of the ith round is the ith bit of the secret, allowing A to deduce it.
For example, imagine that P runs the time-intensive phases by itself and gives, for each of the n time-critical rounds, a response function table for A to use so that A can quickly reply to V for any of V 's challenges. An attack would occur when P gives the correct response function table in the first (1-θ)n rounds. For the next θn rounds, P corrupts one random challenge entry in the table by replacing it with a random response (which might or might not be correct). A passes the protocol if V doesn't ask for any of these challenges, or if it does but the random, altered response is correct. So, A can infer the secret in which θn bits are randomly corrupted. If θ is such that recovering θn bits by exhaustive search is intractable, then such an attack doesn't leak the secret and is considered a valid terrorist fraud.
Many protocols don't offer any form of resistance to this threat. Furthermore, some authors argue that resisting terrorist fraud actually weakens security. 3 Indeed, designing a protocol so that it leaks the secret in the case of such an attack is a dangerous approach. However, we believe that security proofs exist to ensure that these designs (or leaks) pose no risk to honest provers. To some extent, the lack of practical terrorist fraud could decrease interest in terrorist fraud protection. However, we believe that we should ensure security against this type of attack and prepare for practical scenarios that researchers haven't yet imagined. This protection should, of course, come at a reasonable price.
Distance Fraud
One might also wonder about the need for distance fraud protection. Should we worry about malicious provers at all? In an ideal world, we could simply focus on protection against MIM attacks, which were the original motivation behind DB and remain the most important type of attack to address. Still, we think it's important to imagine that malicious provers exist and could try to abuse systems. For instance, liability is an important aspect of payment systems. We can imagine a scenario where a prover attacks the system and then denies having made a payment. The prover could use the guarantees of distance bounding, which it would have falsified, to say that it was too far away to have made that payment. If a prover in a contactless payment system manages to illicitly pay from a distance, it could use the previous argument as an alibi to pretend it was near the verifying point of sale. Conversely, someone with a stolen payment token could run a distance fraud to pay from afar. This shows that we can't neglect security against malicious provers.
Building a Secure Protocol
Attempts to construct fraud-resistant distance-bounding protocols are often flawed. Some researchers have even suggested that it's impossible to do so. 4 Table 1 shows popular distance-bounding protocols and their vulnerabilities as reported up to 2013. 5 In this table, n is the number of DB rounds and θ is a parameter of a terrorist fraud, so that recovering θn bits by exhaustive search is intractable. As the table shows, all but two protocols are vulnerable to at least one threat (one probability is equal to 1), or some instances of the protocol are vulnerable.
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DB protocols are sometimes based on an underlying primitive called a pseudorandom function (PRF). The PRF is unspecified, and security presumably depends on the PRF assumption. Some authors argue that "if f is a PRF, then the protocol is secure." In fact, Ioana Boureanu and her colleagues proved that if PRFs exist, such statements used in semiformal proofs are incorrect. 6 When employed in PRFs with specific trapdoors, many protocols were shown to be vulnerable to distance fraud or MIM attacks. This result appears in Table 1 in the entries containing "p to 1," as the attack's success varies from very low to 1, depending on the PRF. Although these attacks only work with artificial PRFs, they clearly show that the security arguments of DB protocols are unfounded.
In 2008, Chong Hee Kim and his colleagues proved that many distance-bounding protocols are subject to MIM attacks. 7 This revealed the importance of return channels in these protocols' security. The presence or lack of a return channel shows whether the adversary can observe the protocol's output-for example, whether we see an LED light turn green or red on a card reader indicates the success or failure of the access protocol.
Finally, Gerhard Hancke brought light to the fact that noisy communications and their tolerance must also be addressed in security analysis. 8 Hancke showed that almost all protocols in Table 1 (except for SKI-a class of DB protocols introduced by Boureanu and her colleagues in 2013 9,10 -and Marc Fischlin and Cristina Onete's 2013 protocol 11 ) are vulnerable to terrorist fraud when they tolerate noisy conditions. Table 1 shows a dire situation, so the question of provable security against all fraud stood prominently until two classes of provably secure DB protocols-SKI and Fischlin and Onete-were published.
A Formal Security Model
Several DB security models have been published recently. Gildas Avoine and his colleagues provided a complete but informal model for distance bounding in 2011. 4 They define distance bounding as the combination of authentication and distance checking.
Ulrich Dürholz and his colleagues presented a more formal model the same year. 12 Theirs is a communication model in which notions of time and distance are implicit, and protocols are specified by explicitly distinguishing a "lazy" phase and a time-critical one. This model formalizes the three classic types of fraud and the notion of impersonation fraud. The threat models are very specific and presented in terms of protocol session interleaving, which identifies the possible communication flows an active adversary could make in an environment with several provers and verifiers. That is, each fraud type must exhaustively specify what kinds of interleavings aren't allowed (called a tainted session), 12 leading to many variants. In 2013, the authors admitted their model is too strong, possibly due to this specificity and the strict security requirements. 13 In this model, certain insecurity claims (impersonation or terrorist fraud) are hard to defend, leading to unconvincing attacks. Fischlin and Onete later designed a DB protocol, 11 which was proven secure in their 2011 model. 12 In 2013, Boureanu and her colleagues introduced a formal DB model based on techniques and definitions similar to those of interactive proofs. 10 This model seems natural because distance bounding can be viewed as an interactive proof (of proximity). Along with their formal model, they introduced the provably secure SKI in 2013. 9, 10 Considering the 20-year-old DB literature, informal DB discussions, and insecure protocols, we can see that the formal models for DB security have just started to take shape.
Efficiency
What is the performance of the two provably secure protocols, SKI and Fischlin and Onete? What is the price to pay, in terms of the number of rounds of the DB phase, to achieve different security guarantees? Do the different types of frauds' protections really conflict in terms of communication and computation costs? Is terrorist fraud resistance coming at too high a price in terms of protocol rounds? We attempted to answer these questions, and Figure 1 summarizes our findings.
At the peak of the blue line, which represents MIM attacks on SKI, you can see that an MIM attack on SKI that could defeat 40-bit security would require 150 rounds. We arbitrarily assumed that challenge-response rounds fail due to noise with probability p noise = 5 percent, and we tuned the minimal number τ of correct rounds so that the false rejection rate (FRR) would be p FRR = 1 percent. The values are linked by p FRR = Tail(n,τ,1 -p noise ), using the tail of the binomial distribution The upper bound of the probability for an MIM attack on SKI is p MIM = Tail n,t , 2 3 .
We recall that n n tn p t p p p lim 1 log Tail( , , ) For both the SKI protocol and the Fischlin and Onete protocol, the required number of rounds is still large. But what would it mean for a DB protocol to offer optimal security? Note that a DB protocol expecting τ correct rounds out of n binary-challenge rounds is always vulnerable to the following MIM attack: The MIM guesses c i before it arrives and asks for r i from the honest prover. When c i arrives from the verifier, the MIM can answer if its guess is correct. Otherwise, it sends a noisy answer and continues the protocol. This attack works with probability p = Tail n, , 1
, which corresponds to an MIM slope of η ≈ 0.41. Because this attack will always exist, the curve we established is optimal in terms of MIM protection for protocols with binary challenges. This is actually reached by the recent DB2 protocol. 2 So, we could drastically reduce the number of rounds of the SKI and Fischlin and Onete protocols. By comparison, DB2 needs n = 43 rounds for an MIM security of 2 -20 . But the n = 123 rounds that it needs for DF security is suboptimal. Thus, the race for the optimal protocol is still on. Even though some protocols are optimal with respect to one security metric, they are not optimal for all metrics and the correct tradeoff must be identified. 
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Public-Key Distance Bounding
Distance-bounding protocols in the literature are based on a shared key: these protocols assume that the prover and the verifier share a secret. But this assumption is unreasonable in many applications. For instance, a wireless payment terminal at a supermarket is unlikely to share a secret with a customer's credit card. It would make more sense for the credit card to hold a secret and have some certified public key. The payment terminal would need only this public key to verify the proximity proof. Hence, there is a need for public key-based protocols.
In the literature, only three public-key distancebounding protocols exist. The original Brands and Chaum protocol 1 doesn't offer security against terrorist fraud. The 2004 Bussard and Bagga protocol was completely broken by Aslı Bay and her colleagues in 2012. 14 Jens Hermans, Roel Peeters, and Onete's protocol 3 has a security proof but doesn't protect against terrorist fraud. However, it does feature some privacy protection: the verifier also has a public or secret key pair, and an observer can't detect the prover's identity.
We could wonder why there are only two public-key distance-bounding protocols, all without terrorist fraud protection. It's actually easy to transform any symmetric DB into a public-key DB: Run a key agreement (KA) protocol (such as the famous Diffie-Hellman protocol in semi-authenticated mode) to set up a symmetric key sym. Then, run a symmetric DB protocol with key sym (see Figure 2) . The symmetric DB protocol consists of two algorithms, P symmetric (sym) and V symmetric (sym). This could, for instance, be Hancke and Kuhn's protocol. 15 The KA is semi-authenticated: the prover uses KA p (sk), where sk is its long-term secret key, and the verifier uses KA v (pk), where pk is the prover's longterm public key. However, this solution is vulnerable to the terrorist fraud in which the prover just sends sym to the nearby adversary who runs the symmetric DB protocol without having access to sk. Hence, building classic terrorist fraud protection into public-key DB doesn't work.
Thus, the challenge remains in creating a provably secure public-key distance-bounding protocol that resists the three main types of fraud.
Integration
Proximity proofs must be integrated into applications such as payment systems, access control, and remote unlocking devices. The development of the appropriate infrastructures for this is still an open problem.
Secure Remote Unlocking
The task appears simple in the case of unlocking cars using a wireless key. This is because the prover and the verifier are stable points in the infrastructure; one verifier or reader on the car will accept one key belonging to the car's owner. The only problem, then, lies in the key distribution. But key distribution could and should be completely independent from the proof of proximity protocol.
Secure Access Control
For access controls settings-for example, entering and exiting buildings-the task of incorporating DB might seem more difficult. This is because several verifiers might authenticate one given prover at different points; one person's badge will be read by different readers, one on each door that he or she passes through. Clearly, these readers won't store the secrets of all provers. However, we can assume that door readers have secure online access to an authentication server that holds all the keys.
For such an application, DB could be implemented in a straightforward manner: the door reader could relay communications between the prover and the authentication server and measure the time taken by the challenge-response rounds to forward the timer values to the server. We could, however, save a few communication steps between the server and the door. Figure 3 shows an SKI-based protocol that requires only one query or response to and from the server. Essentially, the server selects the challenges for the verifier and sends a vector t of the commitments of all possible responses. That is, t i is a commitment to the response r i , which is expected in round i. The commitment will be opened with the key p i = PRF x (N P ,N V ,L,i,c i )-the parameters are defined in SKI 9,10 -which must be revealed by the prover. This comes at a cost, though, in that the server must compute all commitments and the prover must open them.
Secure Contactless Payments
In a contactless payment infrastructure, the prover (an NFC credit card or smartphone) tries to pay the verifier. Verifiers or readers are more pervasive, and we Figure 2 . A DB protocol that uses a shared secret sym is transformed into a protocol using a secret key sk and a public key pk. Figure 3 . The prover and the verifier run the SKI protocol, but the verifier doesn't know the secret sk. The server helps prepare the DB phase. The prover must further prove that its responses are correct by using a commitment scheme: the answers are sealed in the commitment vector t by the server and opened by the prover. can't always assume that they have secure online access to an authentication server. We also can't assume that any of these verifiers would have access to the credit card's secret. So, to integrate DB within the payment system, we need a solution that's based on public keys. For instance, a prover sends the verifier a certificate on its public key. This signature (with extraction) on the prover's public key is made by a certification authority, such as the bank issuing the card, and the verifiers hold the public keys of all (or at least "root") certification authorities-for example, all reputable banking groups. Using the latter, readers can extract the prover's public key. From here on, the prover and the verifier will run some public key-based distance bounding. We use a public-key distance-bounding protocol such as that of Brands and Chaum; Hermans, Peeters, and Onete; or one based on Figure 2 .
Such a DB protocol integrates into a contactless payment scheme with a certificate infrastructure. A credit card provides a certificate from the bank to the seller. The seller checks the certificate and extracts the card's public key. Then, the card and the reader run the DB protocol to authenticate the credit card and validate its proximity.
B
eyond the implementation challenge, we still need to identify the right tradeoffs between security objectives and costs. As optimal protocols are identified, they must be integrated in real-life applications. In the meantime, we must be careful when carrying a "tootalkative" NFC credit card, willing to pay anyone who asks over the radio channel. 
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